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Employment Discrimination: A Statistician's Look
at Analysis of Disparate Impact Claims
Joseph L. Gastwirth*
Introduction
Employment discrimination is an enduring problem in this
country, preventing the employment or impeding the advancement
of certain members of society. While Title VII has done much to
eliminate practices which are openly discriminatory, many require-
ments for employment and promotion function with discrimina-
tory effect. "Disparate impact" describes the inhibitory effect of
facially neutral employment and promotion practices on protected
groups.' Disparate impact claims pose complicated problems to
plaintiffs, employers and the courts.
The current methods of statistical analysis used by courts to
evaluate disparate impact claims are insufficient to yield fair re-
sults. These methods often fail to examine the persuasiveness of
* Joseph Gastwirth is a professor of statistics and economics at George Wash-
ington University. He has a B.S. in mathematics from Yale University, 1958, and a
Ph.D. in mathematical statistics from Columbia University, 1963. Professor
Gastwirth has published a number of articles on statistical methodology and its ap-
plication in the legal setting and is a member of the American Statistical Associa-
tion's Committee on Law and Justice Statistics. He wishes to express his
appreciation to the editors of Law and Inequality for their helpful suggestions.
1. Title VII prohibits discrimination due to membership in a protected class
(race, color, sex, religion or national origin). 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a) (1988). When
the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., it distin-
guished cases focusing on the consequences of specific employment practices from
cases concerning whether the employer intended to discriminate. Griggs, 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971). A practice, typically a job requirement, which eliminates a substan-
tially higher fraction of a protected class than other applicants or employees is said
to have a disparate impact. In Griggs, the Court stated that practices having a dis-
parate impact need to be shown to be related to successful performance of the job.
Id. at 431. Cases concerning whether an employer was motivated, at least in part,
by discriminatory factors are called disparate treatment cases. As the Court noted
in Intl Bro. of Teamsters v. United States, the issue in disparate treatment cases is
whether "[tihe employer simply treates some people less favorably than others be-
cause of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Intl Bro. of Teamsters,
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977). "Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it
can in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment."
Id. The use of statistics pertaining to similarly qualified individuals in disparate
treatment cases is described in CHARLES A. SULLrVAN, MCHAEL J. ZIMMER AND
RIcHARD F. RicHARDs, EMPLoYmENT DIscRm NATioN, 251-264 (2d ed. 1988).
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an employer's asserted reasons for disparities in its work force.
One case which illustrates the problems with the current use of
statistical methods is Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio.2
While parts of the holding in Wards Cove have been changed by
the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the statistical analysis is still
used by courts to illuminate the basic issues. With a more scruti-
nizing statistical analysis, the Supreme Court might have reached
different conclusions, finding in favor of plaintiffs on some of their
claims. A number of other recent cases further demonstrate the
need for improved statistical analysis of disparate impact claims.
This article examines current statistical methods used by
courts to evaluate disparate impact claims, and suggests an addi-
tional method for improving statistical analysis in this context.
Part I describes the two predominant methods currently used by
courts and examines their application in several recent cases. Part
II introduces Cornfield's method, a superior means for courts to
evaluate an employer's asserted reason for observed disparities in
hires or promotions. Part III applies this new method to cases fo-
cusing on two types of data to demonstrate how the outcomes of
disparate impact claims can depend on statistical analysis. Part IV
suggests several ways to improve the quality of recordkeeping to
the benefit of all parties. The article concludes that the fair evalu-
ation of disparate impact claims requires a more scrutinizing ap-
proach to analysis of data, more thorough recordkeeping by
employers and more refined labor market data from the
government.
I. Statistical Analyses Most Used by Courts
Presently, courts use two types of statistical analysis when
confronted with a claim of disparate impact. These methods are
"intuitive comparisons" and "significance measures."
A. Intuitive Comparisons
When the raw data presents a gross imbalance in the work
force, courts may find discrimination through intuitive compari-
son.3 This method is applied only when the disparity appears quite
large. For example, in Fisher v. Transco-Services Milwaukee,4
only one of 25 employees under 40 was terminated while 10 of 27
employees over 40 were.5 The difference in the termination rates
2. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
3. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW, 344 (1988).
4. 979 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1992).
5. Id at 1245.
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of younger (4%) versus older (37%) workers was nearly ten-fold.
The court found this difference was clearly disproportionate. 6
In Griggs v. Duke Power Company, the U.S. Supreme Court
accepted the use of an intuitive comparison of raw data.7 The em-
ployer had implemented two new requirements for promotion on
the day Title VII took effect.8 These requirements had a signifi-
cant disparate impact on African Americans residing in North Car-
olina at the time.9 Neither standard was related, by design or
intention, to an applicant's ability to learn or perform a particular
job.10 The Supreme Court held that because the two requirements
operated to inhibit promotion of a markedly disproportionate
number of African Americans and were not job related, they were
unlawful under Title VII.11
The Court concluded: "Under [Title VII], practices, proce-
dures, or tests, neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of
intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices .... If an em-
ployment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited."' 2
One major problem with using intuitive comparison of raw
data to determine disparate impact is that the outcome may de-
pend on whether the observed data measures the qualification or
disqualification rate. Take, for example, a test which excludes 5
percent of African American applicants, but only 2.5 percent of
White applicants. If disqualification rates are examined, a court
may find disparate impact because twice the number of African
Americans fail as Whites; however, if the focus of the inquiry is
qualification rates, African Americans would qualify 95 percent of
the time, compared to Whites' 97.5 percent - a ratio which passes
6. In reversing the lower court's summary judgment decision for defendant,
the court stated, "it does not require expertise in differential equations to observe
that an adverse ratio of approximately 10 to 1 is disproportionate." Id- at 1245. The
court may be alluding to Judge Easterbrook's use of a partial derivative in Branion
v. Gramley, 855 F.2d 1256, 1265 n.7 (7th Cir. 1988). See also D.H. Kaye, Statistics for
Lawyers and Law for Statistics, 89 MIcH. L. REv. 1520, 1538 (1991) (showing that
the formula can be derived using only high school algebra).
7. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
8. The requirements were a high school diploma and passage of two aptitude
tests. Id. at 427-28.
9. The EEOC found, of one battery of such tests, that 58% of Whites passed
the test, compared to only 6% of Blacks. I&. at 430, n.6. The Court noted that basic
intelligence needed a means to manifest itself fairly in a testing process and Blacks
had received an inferior education in segregated schools. Id. at 430.
10. Id. at 427-28.
11. Id- at 426 (emphasis added).
12. Id- at 430-31.
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the government's four-fifths rule.13
B. Signifwance Measures
A significance measure is based on the probability that an ob-
served difference in rates would occur by chance.14 If this
probability is low, usually less than .05, we say that a party's data
is "statistically significant." If there is a disparity in hires, but that
disparity has a moderate probability of occurring by chance, then a
court may find that the employer's practice doesn't have a dispa-
rate impact. Significance tests do not have the problem of qualifi-
cation versus disqualification rates mentioned above.15
Nevertheless, results of significance tests require careful
interpretation.1
C. Why These Methods Are Sometimes Inadequate
Intuitive comparisons and significance measures are inade-
quate to resolve all disparate impact claims fairly. Many practices
which adversely affect minority groups will not involve a level of
disparity that is outrageous on its face. For these cases, intuitive
comparisons of raw data alone may not make plain a disparate im-
pact. Furthermore, neither procedure is adequate when the em-
ployer does not attribute the disparity to chance, but to the
13. The Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Criteria focus only upon
qualification rates. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.1 et seq (1992). The Supreme Court has ex-
amined both, but has not indicated when use of either is appropriate. PLAYER,
supra note 3 at 364.
14. Examples of "significance" measures are the Z-score and the Fisher exact
test. The Z-Score measures the number of standard deviations by which a particu-
lar observed outcome differs from its expected value, assuming random selections
from the relevant pool. The Fisher exact test is useful when the sample size is
small; this test calculates the probability of obtaining by chance a result that is at
least as extreme as the actual observed result. For a thorough explanation of the
use of these tests, see PLAYER, supra note 3 at 196-504.
15. The importance of this issue is illustrated by the decision in Council 31 V.
Ward, reversing a district court's award of summary judgment to a defendant.
Council 31 978 F.2d 373 (7th Cir. 1992). In Council 31, the employer's decision to
reduce its work force at certain locations had a disparate impact on Blacks. Indeed,
8.6% (130 of 1512) of Blacks were terminated in contrast to only 3% (87 of 2900) of
Whites. Id at 375. Plaintiffs argued that the ratio of termination rates, 3.5 (3/8.6),
clearly failed the EEOC's four-fifths rule while the defendants noted that the ratio
of the retention rates, .94, satisfied it. Id at 376. Applying Fisher's exact test to the
data yields a p-value of less than one in a million. More importantly, if all 287 em-
ployees who were laid off were Black, 82.34% of the Black employees would have
been retained. In such a case a court would not find disparate impact by applying
the EEOC's four-fifths rule to retention rates, despite extreme facts.
16. See D.H. Kaye, Is Proof of Statistical Significance Relevant? 61 WASH. L.
REV. 1333 (1986); THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESsMENTs AS EVDENCE
IN COuRTs (Stephen E. Feinberg ed. 1989) (discussing the limits of hypothesis test-
ing and problems courts have in using the results of statistical tests).
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presence or absence of a particular quality which the test is
designed to measure. The employer then argues that it is this
quality, measured by the test and present/absent in the applicants,
which accounts for the disparity in those accepted or rejected; fi-
nally, the employer argues that the presence/absence of this qual-
ity is a business necessity. While intuitive comparison and
significance measures cannot analyze the validity of these claims
by defendants, the next section details a method which can.
H. Cornfield's Method - Explanation
A. How It Works
Cornfield's method quantifies the degree to which a "missing
factor" must be present in majority groups in order to account for
observed disparities between majority and minority groups in the
pass rates of a hiring, firing or promotion system.17 Because it
asks whether a particular "missing factor" could account for ob-
served disparities - as opposed to asking whether the disparity
could arise from chance alone - Cornfield's method is responsive
to an individual employer's defense; it is more particularized to the
facts of a case than an intuitive comparison or significance
measure.18
17. The method was developed by the late Professor Jerome Cornfield to ex-
plore whether the difference in cancer rates between smokers and non-smokers
could be due to some characteristic, other than smoking, which was more prevalent
among smokers. For further discussion of Professor Cornfield's analysis, see 1 JO-
SEPH L. GASTWiRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC PoLIcy, 296-98
(1988).
18. Adaption of Cornfield's Lemma to Pass or Hire Rates: let p, be the pass (or
hire) rate of minority applicants, while Pz denotes the pass rate of majority appli-
cants. Let R = p2/p, be the ratio of the rates. Note that R is the inverse or recipro-
cal of the selection rates used in the Uniform Guidelines.
Lemma: In order for a job-related factor, x, to explain disparity between the two
rates, the factor must multiply one's chance (probability) of passing by at least R,
and the proportion of majority group members possessing the factor must be at
least R times the proportion of minority group members possessing it.
Remark: It is intuitively clear that the missing factor (in our analysis) must cause
an R-fold increase in the probability of passing as otherwise it simply could not
fully explain the disparity.
Proof: Let R be the actual effect of the missing factor and assume it fully explains
the disparity, i.e., sufficiently many more majority members have factor x. Thus, a
person without x has probability p of passing, while a person with x has probability
R.p of passing.
Let f, and f2 be the fractions of minority and majority members possessing fac-
tor x; these fractions are the prevalence of the factor and it is clear that f, < f 2.
The probability that a random member of the minority group will pass the test
is
p = f1Rp + (1 - f1)p
as f, minorities have factor x and (I - fl) don't.
1992]
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M. Cornfield's Method Applied
In this article's examination of the statistical data relied on
by courts, two variations of Cornfield's approach are employed to
assess whether a possible defect or missing factor in data offered
by a party could actually explain an observed disparity. These var-
iations are applicable to two types of data comparisons currently
recognized by the courts in Title VII actions.19 The first type of
data is "demographic" or "applicant pool" data used when the ac-
tual percentage of minority hires is compared to a potential or
proxy labor pool derived from an external data source, e.g., census
data on persons employed in similar jobs.20 The second type of
data is "applicant flow" data; this is used when the majority and
minority pass rates of actual applicants or employees are compared
with respect to a hiring or employment practice.21
Similarly, the probability that a random majority member passes the test is:
P2 = f2Rp + (1 - f2)p
Our observed R is of course P2/P, or
f2pR. + (1 - f2)P Rf 2 + (1 - f2)
1) RO 1221 = f~pR, + (1 - fl)p lRf 1 + (1 - fl)
[Note: the actual value of p drops out.]
In equation (1), we ask, what is the largest possible value our observed data R0 can
have? This occurs when the numerator is at its maximum, i.e., f2 = 1 [R > 1 as x
explains the disparity], and when the denominator is at its minimum, i.e., f, = 0
[no minority has x]. Then the numerator is R., denominator is 1, so R. is largest
possible value, or R0 <. R.. This is the intuitive part, R. must exceed the observed
ratio P2/Pi.
Now consider the prevalence ratio 0 = fz/f1 or f2 = Of, [e.g. if 30% of majority
have x and 15% of minority do, then 0 = 2] Substituting Of, for f2 in equation (1)
yields:
Ofl (R. - 1) + 1
(2) =f l(RP - 1) + 1
Cross multiplying (2) yields
Rfi(P. - 1) + Ro = ef1(R -1 ) + 1
or
Ro - 1 = f1(R, - 1)(0 - Ro)
R I-1
Now one can observe that 0 - Ro - is a positive number
fl(P - 1)
as both RP and R. must exceed 1 (remember R0 > 1 to begin with as we are trying
to assess whether factor x explains the disparity, R0) since 0-R 0 is positive; 0 > PLO
and the prevalence condition is satisfied.
19. See PLAYER, supra note 3 at 357-61.
20. Id. at 357.
21. Id. at 359.
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A. Demographic Data
Applied to demographic data, the method determines how
small the percentage of minority members of the proxy labor pool
(f) would have to be in order to reflect the percentage of minority
members actually hired. Given the minority share (s) of actual
hires, one determines the smallest fraction (f) of the proxy labor
pool that minority members would have to form in order for the
employer's hiring data to be statistically consistent with fair (ran-
dom) selection from that pool. This minimal fraction (f) can be
compared to the minority percentage (p) of the proxy labor pool to
assess whether it is likely that an extra factor could reduce the mi-
nority share to f.22
For example, in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, de-
cided in 1989, plaintiffs claimed disparate impact and disparate
treatment.23 In support of their disparate impact claim, plaintiffs
relied on the composition of different classifications of workers
within the employers' work forces to prove discrimination in at-is-
sue jobs;24 defendants made their arguments from census data.25
Part of the Supreme Court's majority opinion focused on which
proxy labor pool was more appropriate - plaintiffs' or defend-
ants'.2 6 The Court also described the "appropriate" shift in the
burdens of production and persuasion, and established the "legiti-
mate business purpose test."27
The legal significance of Wards Cove is diminished by the
1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act.28 This act overturned
the Wards Cove holdings regarding burden of proof,29 and the "le-
22. This method was used persuasively in Capaci v. Katz & BesthoffInc., 711
F.2d 647 (5th Cir. 1983). In Capaci, plaintiffs developed several plausible proxy la-
bor pools from which the defendant could select manager trainees. Id. at 651-52.
Plaintiffs then showed that the chance that there would be no women among the
267 hires made between mid-1965 and January, 1973 was less than one in a billion,
whichever proxy pool one used. Id The appellate opinion also noted that as long
as women comprised at least 2% of the appropriate labor pool, the empoloyer's hir-
ing data would be statistically significant. Id. at 653-54. As the female fraction of
the proxy pools ranged from 16% to 29%, the court did not believe that factors
other than the sex of the applicant (such as willingness to work weekend and night
hours) that the defense claimed were not accounted for in these proxy pools, could
reduce the female fraction of qualified persons to less than 2%. Id. at 652-53.
23. 490 U.S. 642, 648 (1989).
24. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ]
34,437, p. 33,841 (W.D. Wash. 1983) rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S.
642 (1989).
25. Id. at 33,843.
26. 490 U.S. at 650-55.
27. Id at 656-61.
28. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105
Stat.) 1071.
29. Id at § 5, 1991 U.S.S.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1074.
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gitimate business purpose" test,30 restoring the standards set out in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. s3 Wards Cove may remain legally sig-
nificant for cases brought after it but before the 1991 amend-
ments.32 Importantly, however, the statistical issues arising in the
case are not affected by the 1991 Act.
Though the factual basis for the Wards Cove decision rested
on statistical analysis, the Supreme Court did not discuss how
lower courts should evaluate statistical data. The Court did not in-
dicate which job qualifications must be included in a proxy appli-
cant pool, nor how to analyze multi-year data containing some
duplicate applications from the same persons - two alleged flaws
in plaintiffs' data set. Instead, the Court accepted defendants' data
set without analyzing the degree to which these flaws may have af-
fected the accuracy of plaintiffs' statistical analyses. As virtually
no data set is perfect, some methods are needed to assess whether
an alleged flaw in the data - e.g., an omitted factor or a modest
fraction of multiple applications - could explain a large disparity
in hiring or promotion rates. This section will apply an analysis
similar to Cornfield's to the demographic data in Wards Cove to
demonstrate how this method could have been used to evaluate
the alleged flaws in plaintiffs' data.
1. Application of the Method to Wards Cove
In Wards Cove, nonwhites, including Chinese, Filipinos, Jap-
anese and Native Americans, alleged that the hiring, promotion,
pay and housing policies of three Alaskan salmon companies dis-
criminated against them.3 3 The canneries and fish camps were lo-
cated in remote, widely separated areas of Alaska.34 Each was a
self-supporting installation which operated only during the sum-
mer salmon run, a period of three to four months.3 5 The first
charge of discrimination by a plaintiff was filed in October 1973.36
The nonwhites alleged that the companies' hiring practices
had denied them employment as "noncannery" workers on the ba-
30. Id.
31. Id- at § 3, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1071.
32. Id. at § 402, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. (105 Stat.) 1099. See also Daniel V. Kinsella,
The Civil Rights Act and the Retroactivity Muddle, 36 TRiAL LAWYER'S GUDE 460
(1993) and Kristine N. McAlister, Retroactive Application of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1319 (1992).
33. Wards Cove Pacldng Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 663, n.4 (1989).
34. Id. at 646.
35. Id. at 646-47.
36. Id. at 647. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had
filed its own charge in June 1972. Id.
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sis of race.37 The noncannery positions typically paid more than
the "cannery" jobs.38 Most of the noncannery jobs required some
specialized skill (e.g. mechanical, accounting, etc.) but there were
some relatively unskilled jobs (e.g. kitchen help, dock crew, etc.). 39
Hiring for the noncannery jobs occurred at the defendants' offices
in Washington and Oregon, and the hires were predominately
White.40 Cannery workers processed the salmon; these positions
were filled by nonwhites, primarily Alaskan Natives residing in
villages near the canneries and Filipinos hired through a Union
(Local 37).41
The plaintiffs alleged that the following practices constituted
disparate treatment and had a disparate impact on minorities:
1) Separate hiring channels for the cannery and noncannery
positions and the use of word of mouth recruitment.
2) The use of nepotism in hiring.
3) Preferences given to past employees (rehires).
4) A lack of objective employment criteria.
5) Segregation of housing and eating facilities.4 2
In support of their claim, plaintiffs introduced statistics showing
that nonwhites were concentrated in the lower paying cannery
jobs, while Whites held the vast majority of noncannery jobs.43 By
comparing the employers' noncannery work force to a "proxy ap-
plicant pool" consisting of cannery employees, plaintiffs sought to
show that the cannery work forces were not representative of a
fair (random) hiring process. Plaintiffs' proxy labor pool data in-
corporated a person's willingness to work in the remote locations
of the canneries.44 However, it failed to account for special abili-
ties needed to perform the skilled noncannery jobs.
To rebut this evidence, defendants developed a geographic la-
bor market from which they claimed to have recruited.45 This
37. Id. at 647-48.
38. Id. at 642.
39. Id. at 647, n.3 (quoting Atonio v. Wards Cove, 768 F.2d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir.
1985) rehearing granted and opinion withdrawn by 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985,
rev'd 490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
40. Id. at 648.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 647-48.
43. Id at 650.
44. Deposition of Prof. Flanagan at A-376, filed May 17, 1982, Atonio v. Wards
Cove Packing Co., Inc., 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1623 (W.D. Wash. 1983),
rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Plaintiffs' data cov-
ered employment in the entire Alaska salmon canning industry as measured by the
U.S. Bureau of Fisheries (from 1906 to 1939) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(from 1941 to 1955). Id. This data showed the racial composition of persons who
actually chose to work in these seasonal, migrant jobs. Id.
45. Affidavit of Dr. Rees at A-255, filed May 17, 1982, Atonio v. Wards Cove.
1992]
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market consisted of Alaska, Washington, Oregon and California.
"Availability fractions" were obtained from census data from those
states.46 These fractions are the minority proportions af all work-
ers in the state with the skills and other qualifications needed to
perform a particular job. They are determined from census data
by matching the occupational categories used in the census to the
jobs at issue.47 Since an individual's willingness to travel or com-
mute to the job site is not accounted for in census data, the defend-
ant weighted the minority availability in each sub-area by the
fraction of its employees who lived there at their time of hire.48
The district court found that, even though the census data in-
troduced by defendants was dominated by persons preferring full
year fixed location employment, this data was appropriate for de-
fining the labor supply for seasonal work such as in the canner-
ies.49 The court also found that Whites comprised about ninety
percent of the available labor force for cannery and other non-
skilled jobs.50 The court did not define the labor market for the
more skilled jobs but indicated that defendants had compared the
fraction of White employees in various departments to the "rele-
vant labor supply" figures.5 1 The district court found that no gen-
eral pattern of over or underrepresentation emerged from that
comparison.5 2
The district court further found that about 48% of all employ-
ees in the Alaska salmon cannery industry were nonwhite and
that nearly all nonwhites were employed in the cannery jobs.5 3
Since nonwhites formed about 10% of the "laborer" job category in
the Census, the court concluded that nonwhites were over-repre-
sented in these jobs.54 It noted also that Alaskan Natives formed a
high percentage of the population living near four of the canner-
ies.55 Hence, they comprised a high fraction of the resident can-
46. Id at A-256-58.
47. The determination of the availability fraction for a job requires knowledge
of the skills needed to perform the job and their relationship to the occupational
categories used in the Census. An individual's willingness to travel or commute to
the job site as well as the wage paid relative to similar jobs in the area should also
be considered.
48. Rees affidavit at A-255.
49. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 34,
437, p. 33,829 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding 120), rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
50. Id at 33,828 (findings 106 and 107).
51. Id. at 33,829 (finding 123).
52. Id. at 33,829-30 (finding 123).
53. Id- at 33,829 (finding 121).
54. Id at 33,828 (findings 105 and 107).




On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the difference in the
fraction of nonwhites holding cannery and noncannery jobs estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact in both unskilled and
skilled noncannery jobs.56 The Court of Appeals gave more weight
than had the district court to plaintiffs' evidence of housing segre-
gation, and held that the employers' practices of nepotism had a
disparate impact as there were only 17 nonwhites among 349 ne-
potistic hires between 1970 and 1975.57
The Supreme Court held that the cannery work force in no
way reflected the pool of qualified applicants or the qualified la-
bor force appropriate for the skilled noncannery workers.5 8 It
noted that in one cannery about fifteen percent of the new hires
for office work were nonwhite and that if nonwhites formed no
more than fifteen percent of the qualified applicants or relevant
labor force it was "hard to see how the plaintiffs could make their
case."59
The Supreme Court's decision also rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's holding that the different racial proportions of employees in
cannery and noncannery jobs established a prima facie case of dis-
crimination with respect to the unskilled noncannery positions.60
The court stated,
Racial imbalance in one segment of an employer's work force
does not, without more, establish a prima facie case of dispa-
rate impact with respect to the selection of workers for the
employer's other positions, even where workers for the differ-
ent positions may have somewhat fungible skills (as is argua-
bly the case for cannery and unskilled noncannery workers).
As long as there are no barriers or practices deterring quali-
fied nonwhites from applying for noncannery positions, if the
percentage of selected applicants who are nonwhite is not sig-
nificantly less than the percentage of qualified applicants who
are nonwhite, the employer's selection mechanism probably
does not operate with a disparate impact on minorities. Where
this is the case, the percentage of nonwhite workers found in
other positions in the employer's labor force is irrelevant to
the question of a prima facie statistical case of disparate
impact. 61
Statistically speaking, both plaintiffs' and defendants' proxy
56. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 827 F.2d 439, 444 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
57. I& at 445, 447-49.
58. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651 (1989).
59. Id. at 652.




applicant pools were inadequate. Plaintiffs' pool failed to account
for skill differences between skilled and unskilled noncannery
jobs; defendants' pool failed to incorporate as a job qualification,
willingness to relocate temporarily to Alaska. In choosing between
the two proxy applicant pools, the Court simply preferred one
weakness over another. This result was not inevitable. Reexamin-
ing the data highlights three important errors in the courts' analy-
sis of this case: 1) defendants' estimate of the minority
"availability fraction" for the unskilled noncannery jobs was too
low, 2) nonwhites were seriously underrepresented in defendants'
nepotistic hires and 3) plaintiffs' data concerning the Bumble Bee
and Red Salmon facilities supported a prima facie case against
Bumble Bee by Native Alaskans.
Defendant's estimate of the minority "availability fraction"
for the unskilled, noncannery jobs was based on the assumption
that the percentage of minorities in the unskilled labor pool was
the same as that of the overall labor pool, skilled and unskilled.62
This assumption is illogical. Nonwhites (especially Native Alas-
kans) comprised a lower fraction of the highly skilled, noncannery
workers than the nonwhite percentage of the overall labor force in
the four-state region. Common sense implies that they will there-
fore form a larger percentage of the labor pool available for un-
skilled jobs, both cannery and noncannery. A comparison of the
percent of nonwhites employed as managers with the correspond-
ing percent of laborers in Table 1 illustrates this point. Notice that
the relationship between minority availability fractions for the oc-
cupational categories is similar in all the geographical regions.
Thus, overrepresentation in one (unskilled) category and under-
representation in another (skilled) are inextricably linked.
An examination of the affidavit of the defendants' expert in-
dicates that the availability fractions were from a four-state
weighted labor market developed using a three-step process.63
62. Affidavit of Dr. Rees at A-255, files May 17, 1982, Atonio v. Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc., 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Car. (BNA) 1623 (W.D. Wash. 1983), rev'd,
827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
63. Step 1. For each county with a population of 250,000, or each Census group
of counties aggregated to have at least that population, the defendants' expert de-
termined the proportion of all employees who resided there at the time of their
hire. Id. at A-254. (The Census file used by defendants ((the 1% sample)), does not
report data for counties with fewer than 250,000 residents. It combines adjacent
small counties in order to reach that threshold. As a result, the state of Alaska is a
single county group in this data file. Id.) This proportion estimates the share of
hires that should come from that sub-area of the labor market, assuming that there
are no barriers to all potential applicants.
Step 2. Using the Census 1% Public Use Sample, one determines the minority
fraction of the relevant labor force, i.e., persons in each county group possessing the
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TABLE 1 The Minority* Percentage of Persons Employed in 1980
in Various Occupations by Geographic Region.
OCCUPATIQN**
Region Manager Service Labor-Handler
All Four states 9.00 16.76 13.51
Alaska 9.53 26.82 18.49
Rural Alaska 7.13 36.67 32.72
Source: Author's calculations from Table 78 of the General Social
and Economic Characteristics Volume for each state from
the 1980 Census.
* The Minority Category includes African Americans, Native
Americans and persons of Asia-Pacific origin. The relative fraction
of these groups varies within the states. Asians form the largest
minority in California; Native Americans the largest in Alaska.
** The percentages in the table are used to assess whether an
employer's work force can be regarded as a sample from the
relevant labor pool. If one believes that the appropriate labor
market for service workers is the four-state area, one compares the
minority percentage of such employees to 16.76%. If one felt that
the rural Alaska area was most appropriate because most people
would not travel far for such low paying jobs, one would compare
the minority percentage of service employees to 36.67 to assess
whether hiring seemed fair.
relevant skill. (The Census Bureau issues a 1 in 100 random sample of individual
records for research use. Id. at A-253-54.) The defendants calculated availabilities
for many job groups but this analysis will focus on the overall figure.
Step 3. The minority share of the labor force for each type of job is a weighted
average of their availability fractions in each county group. The weights are the
county group fractions obtained in step 1. Id. at A-255.
The Census 1% Public Use Sample is much smaller than the 15 to 20% sample
actually used in the Census publications reporting occupational, labor force and ed-
ucational characteristics. Thus, the availability fractions used by the defendants'
expert were subject to greater variability than usual in these cases. This variability
was properly incorporated in the statistical tests relied on by the defendants' ex-
pert. Id. at A-269.
However, there remain serious statistical questions concerning the defendants'
proposed labor market. Because of the population constraint in the creation of
county groups by the Census Bureau, the state of Alaska is just one county group.
Id. at A-254. Thus, the weighting procedure did not give areas near the canneries
their proper weight. More importantly, it is preferable to base the weights used in
step 1 on the applicant data, rather than on the residence pattern of employees, as
the employees reflect the hiring practices of the defendant. See DAVID C. BALDUS
& JAMES W.L. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 61-67 (1987 Supp.); see
generally SHELDON E. HABER & JOSEPH L. GASTWiRTH, Specifying the Labor Mar-
ket for Individual Firms, 101 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26 (Aug. 1978). This is espe-
cially important when the effect of practices such as "word of mouth" recruiting,
nepotistic hiring or a preference for rehiring former employees is at issue, as here.
The difference between minority availability percentages obtained from employee
versus applicant weights can be substantial. See Markey v. Tenneco Oil Co., 635
F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1981), qff'd, 707 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1983). In an action for discrim-
inatory hiring practices under Title VII, the court in Markey affirmed the use of
weights based on the percentage of minority applicants from a particular area
rather than the percentage of minorities from the areas in which employees re-
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From this weighted labor market, defendants estimated the over-
all minority availability for the skilled noncannery jobs at 10.1%. 64
Based on the questionable assumption regarding the relationship
between availabilities for skilled and unskilled jobs mentioned
above,65 defendants estimated that the minority availability for the
unskilled noncannery jobs was also 10.1%.66 A more accurate esti-
mate would have been higher.6 7
Applying Cornfield's approach to limited applicant data given
in the decision on remand 68 also indicates that defendants' availa-
bility figure is too low. Of 1,966 applicants for the at-issue jobs, 539
identified their race.6 9 Of these, 138 were nonwhite and 401 were
White, i.e., nonwhites formed 25.6% of racially identified appli-
cants.70 The district court discounted this data because only a
quarter of the applications had racial information.7 1 In fact, the
court concluded that the 138 minority applications formed only 7%
of the total applications and may have considered this percentage
as their availability. 2 This conclusion is based on an unreasonable
assumption: that the 1,427 non-racially identified applicants were
all White.
In order for the racially identified applicant data to be consis-
tent with the defendants' 10.1% availability figure, nonwhites must
be far more likely to identify their race on an application than
Whites. Cornfield's method shows that nonwhites would need to
racially identify three times more often than Whites, a rather
sided. The court reasoned that using applicant data would deter a business from
hiring its employees from a largely White area in an effort to limit the percentage
of minorities in the potential employee pool. Id. at 500. Weighting by applicants'
residences yielded an availability of 42%, while weighting by the residence of em-
ployees at their time of hire yielded an availability of 32.6%. Compare Markey v.
Tenneco Oil Co., 707 F.2d 172, 173 (5th Cir. 1983) with Markey v. Tenneco Oil Co.,
635 F.2d 497, 500 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981). This difference is quite noticeable.
64. Rees Affidavit at A-276 (Subtracting 89.9% from 100% Whites). The defend-
ant's questionable weighting process implies that the minority availability figures
accepted by the court were lower than they should have been.
65. Supra note 62 and accompanying text.
66. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) V 34,437,
p.33,828 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding 107), rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987), rev'd,
490 U.S. 642 (1989).
67. The weighting system utilizing residence of employees at time of hire
rather than applicants is the most serious statistical problem in a case where fair
recruitment is a major issue and the racial mix in the different sub-areas of the la-
bor market is so varied.
68. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., No. CS-74-145-JLQ 1991 WL 67529
(W.D. Wash. 1991).
69. Id. at *2.
70. Id




large factor73 A more conservative assumption of 1.5:1 or 2:1
would estimate the minority share of the 1,966 applicants at signif-
icantly higher percentages: 18.7% and 14.7% respectively. 74
Combined with a careful analysis of the assumptions upon
which defendant's "availability fractions" were based, Cornfield's
approach creates serious doubt about the accuracy of defendants'
estimate and suggests that plaintiffs' data, though flawed, may
have been preferable, especially in regard to the lesser skilled non-
cannery jobs. At the least, the Court should have given both esti-
mates weight in its determination of whether defendants had
discriminated, rather than rejecting one estimate as inaccurate in
favor of another estimate which is equally flawed.
A similar technique can be used to assess the impact of nepo-
tism on nonwhites. The nonwhite share of nepotistic hires,
4.87%,75 is statistically consistent with a nonwhite availability of
7.2% or less using the 95% level of confidence.7 6 In order for the
nonwhite hire rate of 4.87% to fall within two standard devia-
tions77 of what would be expected given fair hiring, the nonwhite
availability must be no more than 7.2%. The criteria for three
standard deviations yield a corresponding figure of 8.4%.78 Since
the defendants' availability figure, 10.1%, is greater than 8.4%, the
nepotistic hires cannot have been drawn from a pool with the same
nonwhite availability figures as the four-state labor pool accepted
by the court. This indicates that the defendants' use of nepotism
73. If minority members formed 10.1% of the 1,966 applicants, there would be
199 minority and 1,767 majority applicants. This implies that 138/199 or 69.3% of
the minority members answered the question while 401/1767 or 22.7% of the
Whites did. Such a large difference in response rates should at least require a care-
ful explanation. A ratio of 1.5:1 to 2:1 seems more reasonable than 3:1.
74. Suppose minorities are twice as likely as Whites to respond to the question
about race. Let M and W denote the number of minority and White applicants, re-
spectively, and let p be the probability that a White applicant responds. The follow-
ing equations then hold: M+W = 1,966; pW = 401 ; 2pM = 138. Their solution is:
p = .239, W = 1,677,and M = 289. Hence, the minority fraction of applicants is
239/1966 = .147.
75. 17/349 = 4.87%.
76. The upper end of the two sided 95% confidence interval is given by p +
2p(1-p)/n or (.0487) + 2(.0487)(.9513)/343 = .072. See GAsTWIRTH, supra note 17
at 164.
77. The Supreme Court generally assumes that the line of statistical signifi-
cance lies at two standard deviations. See Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977);
Hazelwood School District v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
78. The upper end of the two sided confidence interval corresponding to the
three standard deviation criteria is given by
p(I - p) (.0487)(.9513)




as a hiring practice reduced the nonwhite fraction of hires below
their availability in defendants' four-state labor pool.
A significance test shows that the number of actual nepotistic
minority hires (17) is 3.24 standard deviations from the number ex-
pected (35.25) assuming a process of fair (random) selection from
an applicant pool with a nonwhite availability fraction of 10.1%.79
This result is generally considered highly statistically significant.
Moreover, the above calculation assumed defendants' availability
figure of 10.1%. Had the court used a more realistic figure, ob-
tained by assuming that nonwhites were perhaps twice as likely as
Whites to racially identify themselves, the disparity would be even
more significant. Given the significance of the impact of nepotism,
defendants should have been required to provide a stronger rebut-
tal than simply showing that only qualified relatives were hired.80
Finally, the statistics concerning three skilled jobs at Bumble
Bee and Red Salmon support a prima facie case against the Bum-
ble Bee facility. Because Bumble Bee and Red Salmon were both
located on Bristol Bay, an area with a high fraction of Native Alas-
kans,81 the two canneries faced the same labor market and should
have hired from a common pool of potential employees. However,
the fraction of nonwhites hired by Bumble Bee, most of whom pre-
sumably were Native Alaskan, was .68% (3/443) while the corre-
sponding fraction among Red Salmon's hires was 7.9% (42/530).82
Applying Fisher's exact test to the difference between the two
fractions of minority hires yields a statistically significant result at
the .05 level.8 3 Indeed, the p-value8 4 is less than one in a billion.8 5
This result is highly significant and should have provided strong
support for plaintiffs' case against Bumble Bee.
79. Clearly, this exceeds the two to three standard deviation test accepted by
the Court in Castenada. Castenada v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977).
80. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 54 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1623,
1626 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding no nepotistic practice for hiring "at-issue" employ-
ees because the applicants were qualified for the positions), rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th
Cir. 1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
81. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc., 34 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) % 34,437,
p. 33,828-29 (W.D. Wash. 1983) (finding 109), rev'd, 827 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). Eighty-eight percent of the plaintiff class members were
Native Alaskan. Id. at 33,829 (finding 123).
82. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 677 n.24 (1989) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
83. A similar test of the Red Salmon data against the 10.1% figure does not
yield a significant result at the .05 level.
84. The p-value is the probability that such a disparity in actual hires would oc-
cur given the same hiring rates at the Bumble Bee and Red Salmon plants.
85. This use of comparative data for firms in the same or similar labor markets
is discussed in BALDus and CoLE, supra note 63. They note that defendants have
also used such data to rebut allegations of discrimination. Id. at 50-51.
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Cornfield's approach supports the inference that Bumble Bee
discriminated against Native Alaskans. The smallest availability
fraction consistent with the nonwhite fraction of Bumble Bee's
hires at the two standard deviation or 95% confidence level crite-
ria, is 1.5%. This is far below any of the availability figures in the
record.86 In fact, even using the 10.1% availability fraction ac-
cepted by the district court, Bumble Bee's nonwhite hires were 6.5
standard deviations below what would be expected by fair (ran-
dom) hiring from the defendants' labor market.87 It is surprising
that none of the opinions realized this gross disparity nor required
Bumble Bee to justify its hiring procedures.8 8
Wards Cove illustrates the difficulty courts have when the
relevant data is not available. Often, data on actual applicants
("applicant flow" data) including their background qualifications
can be used. However, federal guidelines do not require the reten-
tion of personnel records for seasonal jobs as is required for full-
time, permanent jobs.8 9 In this case, too, the employers' hiring
practices - nepotism and hiring at sites other than the plants
themselves - were such that data on actual applicants were likely
to be nonrepresentative of the pool of potential applicants. More-
over, both plaintiffs' and defendants' proxy labor pool data were
nonrepresentative. Cornfield's method highlights the degree of
the flaws in both data sets, and would have enabled the court to
give appropriate weight to both parties' data in rendering its
decision.
The preceding Wards Cove analysis shows how Cornfield's
approach and related techniques could be used by plaintiffs. The
following decision indicates how this new method can also serve
defendants.
2. Demographic Data in Wooden v. Board of Educ.
Though it frequently may be used to give greater weight to
plaintiffs' data in the face of defendants' assertions of flaws, Corn-
field's approach should not be considered a plaintiff's tool. Indeed,
the method may sometimes be used to strengthen defendants' re-
86. The lowest availability fraction was the 7% figure based on the assumption
that all applicants who did not identify their race were White. Supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
87. This is equivalent to a probability or p-value of less than 1 in 100,000.
88. But see Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 677-78
(1989)(Stevens, J., dissenting).




buttals because it highlights the degree to which an alleged flaw or
missing factor may have affected a data set.
In Wooden v. Board of Educ.,90 plaintiff alleged he was dis-
criminated against on the basis of age. He had been a teacher in
the area from 1959 to 1972 and had pursued private business for
ten years.91 In 1983, he returned to teaching as a substitute
teacher.92 He was hired as a part-time teacher in 1987. 93 He al-
leged that the Board's policies of giving a maximum of fourteen
years credit for prior experience and giving greater weight to re-
cent teaching experience had a disparate impact on applicants over
forty.94 Though there were over 2000 applicants,9 5 plaintiff did not
present any statistical data demonstrating the adverse impact of
these practices.96
The Board asserted that it was able to hire better qualified
teachers because the applicant pool was so large, that the plaintiff
had some unfavorable evaluations in his file and that his inter-
views were unimpressive.97 Moreover, it demonstrated that 41%
(36/86) of its 86 hires were over 40 years of age.98 The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant and the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.99
Obtaining a confidence interval for the fraction of the avail-
able labor pool over 40 shows that defendant's 41% figure is statis-
tically consistent with fair (random) hiring as long as applicants
over 40 comprised no more than 52.3% of the applicant pool. 00
The court did not determine a labor pool, but applicants typically
are younger than the overall labor force.101 Census data indicates
the over-40 percentage of the labor force for similar teaching posi-
tions would be less than 50%.102 Therefore, it is unlikely that ap-
90. 931 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1991).




95. Id. at 378.
96. Id. at 380.
97. Id. at 378.
98. Id-
99. Id. at 377.
100. As previously, we use the .05 level or two standard deviation criteria to de-
fine statistical significance. Smaller deviations are considered consistent, i.e., the
probability that they would occur by chance exceeds .05.
101. See GASTWIRTH, supra note 17 at 252-53.
102. In 1980, the median age of secondary school teachers in the nation was 36.3
years for males and 34.8 years for females. The corresponding median ages for ele-
mentary school teachers were 36.2 years for males and 35.8 years for females. The
detailed data is given in 1980 CENSUS REPORT, DETAILED POPULATION CHARACTER-
ISTICS, U.S. SUMMARY SECTION A: UNITED STATES, Table 280. The data refers to
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plicants over 40 formed over 52.3% of the applicant pool. The
district court's finding is strengthened by the application of Corn-
field's approach.
B. Applicant Flow Data
Cornfield's method is designed to evaluate whether an ob-
served disparity of minority versus majority pass or success rates
could be due to or explained by an omitted factor.103 The method
is relevant for disparate impact analysis as government guidelines
use the "four-fifths" or "80%" rule.10 4 The 80% rule states that
whenever the selection ratio - the ratio of the minority pass rate
to the majority pass rate - is less than four-fifths, the employer's
requirement or test has a disparate impact and should be shown to
be job related.1 05 In order for a missing variable to account for a
disparity meeting the 80% rule, the fraction of majority applicants
possessing the factor must be at least 1.25 times the corresponding
fraction of minority applicants and the factor should increase one's
chance of passing the test or meeting the requirement by 1.25. If
the selection ratio is .5 (50%) then the missing factor would have
to double one's chance of passing the test, and the fraction of ma-
jority applicants possessing it must be twice the corresponding
fraction of the minority applicants. Hence, the smaller the selec-
tion ratio is, the greater the difference must be between majority
and minority groups with respect to qualifications that were not
accounted for in a statistical comparison; in order for the disparity
to be due to these qualifications rather than race, sex, etc., major-
ity groups must be much more likely to possess the quality.
1. Applicant Flow Data in Allen v. Seidman
In Allen v. Seidman, plaintiffs were a class of African Ameri-
can bank examiners who failed the "Program Evaluation" test
used by the FDIC to decide whether to promote examiners from
the GS-9 level to the GS-11 level. 0 6
The district court found that the program evaluation test had
a disparate impact because 39% of the Black candidates passed
compared to 84% of Whites; this pass rate was highly significant. 0 7
employed persons, so recent graduates, the majority of whom are under 40, would
not be included.
103. For further discussion, see GAsTWIRTH supra note 17 at 296-98.
104. Uniform Guidelines for Employer Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1607.4(D) (1978).
105. Id




The FDIC claimed that the data did not demonstrate a disparate
impact because: passing the test was not equivalent to being pro-
moted as 56% of the Black candidates and 92% of the Whites were
promoted to GS-11 within one year after they took the exam; the
plaintiffs' analysis was simplistic in that it did not account for
other possible factors, such as education, that may have affected
performance on the test.108
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Posner,
dismissed the first argument, noting that the relationships be-
tween the exam pass rates and promotion success rates for Blacks
and Whites were approximately the same;109 virtually everyone
who passed the test was promoted.110 Moreover, only 27% of
Blacks who failed the test were promoted within one year, com-
pared to 53% of Whites.ll
Judge Posner's opinion observed that if the two groups, Black
and White GS-9 bank examiners, had substantially different skill
characteristics, as in the skilled and unskilled jobs in Wards
Cove,112 then the plaintiffs would need to take them into ac-
count.11 3 In the present case, all the examiners had worked for
the FDIC for between 5 and 15 years, served one or more years at
the GS-9 level and obtained a recommendation from their regional
director in order to take the exam.1 4 As the pool of test takers
seemed reasonably homogeneous with respect to relevant job char-
acteristics, the large disparity in success rates suggested racial bias.
The opinion mentioned a few possible ways in which the Black
candidates might have been less qualified.115 However, it empha-
sized that the FDIC did not demonstrate an imbalance in any of
the relevant background characteristics. 116 The court observed
that it is easy to take "pot shots" at a statistical analysis and indi-
cated that the defendant needed to do more than raise a potential
flaw.117 Defendant should show that the alleged defect had a ma-






112. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
113. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d at 379.
114. Id
115. Id. at 379-80.
116. Id.
117. Id at 380.
118. Id. The opinion correctly observed that a regression analysis, which in-
cluded the alleged omitted variables, might have strengthened plaintiffs' case in-
stead of reducing the racial disparity. Id.
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Applied to applicant flow data, Cornfield's method supports
the appropriateness of the simple comparison of pass rates when
the candidate pools are approximately comparable with respect to
background qualifications. For example, in Allen, the ratio of the
White pass rate to the Black pass rate was 84/39 = 2.15. In order
for some other factor to explain a disparity of this magnitude, the
factor, by itself, must increase one's chance of passing by at least
2.15 and 2.15 times as many White candidates as Black candidates
must possess the factor. 19 Thus, a modest imbalance in, say,
whether the candidates had a master's degree in a business subject,
could not fully explain the disparity between the pass rates in Al-
len even if it doubled one's chance of passing the test because the
second condition (prevalence) would be unlikely to be met; in
other words, though possessing a master's degree in a business sub-
ject might have doubled an employee's chance of passing the "Pro-
gram Evaluation" test, it was unlikely that twice as many Whites
had Master's degrees in a business subject given the homogeneity
of the class of candidates for promotion.
Of course, to obtain the best estimate of the effect of race,
one would have to use an appropriate statistical technique that
would incorporate the additional factor which defendant alleged
created the racial disparity. Cornfield's method, however, shows
that the disparity in pass rates could not be fully explained unless
the new factor satisfied the strength of relationship and preva-
lence requirements. From the information in the opinion, it is dif-
ficult to imagine that the proportion of White candidates
possessing a factor so highly related to passing - i.e., a factor
which makes its possessor 2.15 times more likely to be promoted
- was twice the proportion of Black applicants possessing the fac-
tor, particularly when that factor could not be identified by the
FDIC.
2. Applicant Flow Data in Hill v. Miss. State Employment
Serv.
In Hill v. Miss. State Employment Serv., the plaintiff, Ms.
Hill, challenged the state's job referral system's reliance on subjec-
tive traits and out of code job referrals.12 0 In order to support her
claims of disparate treatment and disparate impact, plaintiff
119. The general result given in GASTWIRTH, supra note 17 at 296, states that to
explain a ratio of R between two rates, a factor must create an R-fold increase in
the rate (of passing a test) and must be R times more prevalent in the group with
the higher rate.
120. 918 F.2d 1233, 1235 (5th Cir. 1990). Out of code referrals were referrals to
jobs other than that or those to which the applicant specifically applied.
1992]
Law and Inequality
showed statistically significant racial disparities in referrals for the
waitress and cashier jobs.121 Defendant's expert criticized plain-
tiff's analysis because it did not incorporate education and experi-
ence factors; however, he noted that these changes would only
reduce the number of standard deviations calculated by the plain-
tiff's expert.122  Nonetheless, the district court found for
defendant.
The majority decision upheld the lower court, in part relying
on the plaintiff's failure to factor in the effect of education and ex-
perience.1 23 Judge Rubin's dissent noted that on several occasions
rather unusual referral patterns occurred; for example, when fill-
ing a request for waitresses, the Employment Service sent 22
Whites but no Blacks for an interview.1 -4 Ten of the Whites were
"out of code," three failed to satisfy the minimum experience re-
quirement and five lacked the requisite education. 25 Data from
the employment service showed that nonwhites formed about 40%
of all job applicants. 126
Using the methods described in this article, one can respond
to defendant's criticism of plaintiff's data. The largest fraction of
the eligible pool which Blacks could comprise in order for the ob-
served data, p, (none out of 22) to have a reasonable probability of
occurring by chance would be p = .156.127 Since the fraction of
Black applicants for such jobs was more than twice that figure, i.e.,
p L .40, it is unlikely that an even-handed application of education
and prior experience criteria would have reduced the Black frac-
tion of persons qualified for waitress referrals to less than .156.
Furthermore, it was illogical to require plaintiffs to account for
factors that defendants merely said they used when the actual data
shows the criteria were not used systematically. These considera-
tions would have supported Judge Rubin's dissent, especially as he
identified several similar referral patterns indicating that this ex-
121. Id. at 1235 n.5. Statistical comparisons of the pool of applicants in the job
codes and the Service's referrals for waitress and cashier positions yielded standard
deviations of 8.78 and 3.41 from their expected values. Both of these test results are
highly statistically significant.
122. Id. at 1237. From the opinion, it appears that the defendant did not show
that incorporating these factors would reduce the standard deviation of the
shortfall in Black referrals to less than two. Indeed, the dissent indicates that de-
fendant's expert conceded that a significant disparity would remain after these fac-
tors were included. Id. at 1243.
123. Id at 1240.
124. Id at 1242.
125. Id
126. Id at 1236.
127. Setting this probability at .025, corresponding to the two-sided two standard
deviation criteria adopted by the Supreme Court, p = .156. See supra note 77.
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ample was not an isolated one.m2
3. Applicant Flow Data in Rose v. Wells Fargo
In Rose v. Wells Fargo, two managers filed a charge of age
discrimination after they were terminated following the merger of
the Crocker and Wells Fargo banks.129 The district court granted
defendant's request for summary judgment and the plaintiffs ap-
pealed.130 Of the 153 employees in Crocker's Special Asset Divi-
sion, about half lost their jobs, including four of eight managers.13
The plaintiffs submitted data showing that 73.5% of the division's
employees over 50 were terminated, while the corresponding
figures were 34.1% for employees between ages 40 and 49 and
28.2% for those under 40.132 Another statistical analysis of the ter-
mination decisions showed that age was the most important factor
in predicting whether an employee was discharged.133
To respond to plaintiff's data, the bank showed that the aver-
age age of Wells Fargo and Crocker employees before the mergers
was 35.80 and 36.61, respectively, while twenty-two months after
the merger the average age of employees was 36.77.134 Other data
showed that the percentage of employees age 40 or over remained
the same.13 5 Moreover, the bank claimed that a greater proportion
of discharges occurred at the management level - positions typi-
cally held by older employees - than in other jobs. 36 The Ninth
Circuit accepted this explanation without requiring defendant to
submit data, by age group, for the different job categories. 137 As
128. I& at 1243.
129. 902 F.2d 1417, 1419 (9th Cir. 1990).
130. I& at 1419-20.
131. Id- at 1420.
132. IX at 1423.
133. Unfortunately, the nature of this analysis was not described. IH at 1423.
Most likely it was a logistic regression relating the probability of being discharged
to various factors, including age.
134. Id. at 1423 n.5. The court's decision to accept this data on average age of
employees two years after plaintiffs' terminations is logically questionable given
that the same circuit, in O'Brien v. Sky Chefs, did not accept defendant's data from
a period after plaintiff's complaint. O'Brien, 670 F.2d 864, 867 (9th Cir. 1982). Also,
in a recent sex discrimination case, the Seventh Circuit said that evidence of har-
assment which occurred 13 months before a woman quit was not admissable be-
cause it could not have been the cause of her decision. Tobey v. Extel/JWP Inc. 985
F.2d 330, 333-34 (7th Cir. 1993).
135. Rose, 902 F.2d at 1423.
136. Id-
137. Id. at 1425. If the data for the different categories were available, the differ-
ences in termination rates in each could be combined as in GASTWiRTH, supra note
17, at 229-37, to assess whether there was a common age-related differential. Alter-




workers over 50 were nearly twice as likely to lose their jobs as
employees between 40 and 49, and nearly three times as likely as
those under 40, it is not clear that holding a management post
fully explains the disparity. Cornfield's method indicates that
managers would need to have been fired at two to three times the
rate of other employees and that employees over 50 would have to
be twice as likely to hold managerial jobs as persons between 40
and 49.138 Although these conditions might have been satisfied,
the defendant should have been required to document them with
relevant statistics. It is far from clear that employees over 50
would be twice as likely to be employed as managers as persons
age 40 to 49.
4. Applicant Flow Data in Gilty v. Village of Oak Park
Gilty v. Village of Oak Park'L39 illustrates how defendants
can prevail using reasoning similar to Cornfield's by focusing on
whether the practice at issue caused the plaintiff to lose a job op-
portunity. Plaintiff applied for promotion to police sergeant and
took part in the evaluation process, which consisted of a written
test (50%), performance evaluation (30%) and oral interview
(20%).140 When the eligibility list was issued, he ranked thirty-
third out of fifty-one candidates.141 While he did well on the writ-
ten test (the 11th highest score), he received the lowest score
(22.977 of 30) on the performance assessment. 42 In August 1987,
he filed a charge of discrimination.14 3
Plaintiff's case was based on the fact that no Black person
had ever been a police sergeant or lieutenant in the Village; how-
ever, plaintiff did not submit data on the number of those positions
or the number of such jobs which were filled during the relevant
time period.144 Plaintiff also noted that the other four Black appli-
cants received low performance evaluations,145 but did not show
they were statistically significantly lower than those of the White
applicants.
The Seventh Circuit found that even if plaintiff's weak statis-
tical showing established a prima facie case, i.e., that the perform-
138. Similarly, employees over 50 would have to be three times as likely to hold
managerial jobs as persons under 40.
139. 919 F.2d 1247 (7th Cir. 1990).
140. Id. at 1248.
141. Id at 1249.
142. Id-
143. I&
144. Id. at 1253.
145. I& at 1249.
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ance evaluation portion of the promotion process had a disparate
impact, defendant showed that dropping that part of the exam
would not have altered the plaintiff's ultimate failure to obtain
the job.146 Using an argument similar to Cornfield's, the court ob-
served that in order for the plaintiff to have received one of the
two promotions made from the list, he would have to justify an in-
crease in his total score of at least 8.04 points.147 Even had he re-
ceived a perfect score of 30 his score would have been raised by
only 8.023 points. 48 Moreover, no candidate had a perfect evalua-
tion (the highest was about 28.5).149 The opinion also found that
even if the performance evaluation scores were eliminated, i.e., the
applicants were ranked only on the written and oral exams, Gilty
would move from thirty-third to twentieth.5 0 Hence, the per-
formance evaluation aspect of the promotion process could not
have caused the plaintiff's failure to be promoted.
IV. Suggestions for Improving Employment Discrimination Data
The 1991 Act resolves many of the issues raised by the Wards
Cove decision;' 5 ' however, the Act did not address the statistical
analysis or the types of evidence upon which plaintiffs may rely
when an employer has not maintained records which facilitate a
narrowly focused analysis of its practices. 52 This article demon-
strates that inadequacies in the statistical data and analyses sub-
mitted to the court in Wards Cove forced it to choose between two
labor pools - one incorporating skill level but not willingness to
relocate, and the other the reverse. 5 3 The Courts' failure to use
statistical tests and other tools to assess the soundness of the infer-
ences drawn from the available data caused it to miss the strength
of plaintiffs' case on the issues of nepotism and hiring for the
146. Id at 1253 n.10. In their assessment that the statistical case was weak, both
the district court and the Seventh Circuit felt that the sample size of 66 officers -
only 5 of whom were Black - was too small. If the five Black officers received the
five lowest evaluations, standard statistical procedures would find this significant.
Indeed, the probability that this would occur by chance, i.e., assuming the groups
were equally qualified, is less than one in a million. Courts would gain additional
insight if they allowed the parties to analyze samples of smaller sizes. Neverthe-
less, because the defendant could have rebutted a prima facie case in Gilty, the
lack of an appropriate statistical analysis of the evaluation scores probably did not
affect the ultimate outcome. Gilty, 919 F.2d at 1253.
147. Id. at 1253 n.10.
148. Id
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1254.
151. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
152. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
153. See supra notes 62-89 and accompanying text.
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lesser skilled, noncannery jobs, especially at the Bumble Bee
facility.154
This article shows that many courts are not requiring plain-
tiffs to make a "perfect" statistical presentation, nor do they care-
fully scrutinize the defendants' criticisms to ensure that an
asserted defect is serious enough to alter the ultimate inference of
a statistically significant disparity. This article introduces two
methods which should assist courts to assess imperfect data.
The following suggestions are intended to ensure that a suffi-
ciently reliable database is available to examine charges of discrim-
ination and the business .necessity of practices having a disparate
impact:
A. Record Keeping
The EEOC (or a new statute) should require all employers to
preserve personnel records, including test results and personnel
evaluations, for at least three years; these records should be re-
tained longer if a charge is brought. If the data needed to establish
a prima facie case is missing because of defendant's failure to com-
ply with these requirements, courts should assume the information
would have been sufficiently favorable to plaintiffs to establish a
prima facie case.155 As defendants would need these records to
rebut a plaintiff's case, they will have an incentive for careful re-
cordkeeping. Courts could no longer decide that an employer who
destroyed applications 30 days after hiring156 acted in good faith.
The labor law and industrial relations community should
take steps to inform the Census Bureau of their need for reliable
occupational, wage and educational data on a countywide basis.
Unfortunately, the 1980 Census EEO tape only reported this infor-
mation for Metropolitan Statistical Areas which include several
counties. This over-aggregation makes it difficult to develop an ap-
propriate weighted labor pool for the various occupations, espe-
cially for employers at a single site in a large metropolitan area.
Employers would benefit from such information. They could de-
velop more accurate affirmative action plans using their own appli-
154. See also Bill Shaw, Gary A. Moore and Michael K. Braswell, Ward's Cove
Packing Company v. Atonio, 41 LABOR L.J. 183 (1990).
155. Of course, courts would ascertain whether the other criteria needed to es-
tablish a prima facie case, such as the availability of the job, were satisfied by the
plaintiff.
156. See EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 52 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1734
(11th Cir. 1990). For a general survey of the incentives to destroy evidence, see
Charles R. Nesson, Incentives to Destroy Evidence in Civil Litigation. The Need
for Vigorous Judicial Action, 13 CARDozo LAw REv. 793 (1991).
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cant data to create proper weights, thereby monitoring their
recruitment and hiring policies to ensure fairness.
B. Statistical Analysis
Courts should take a more decision-theoretic approach to dis-
parate impact claims and consider the economic and public policy
implications of an employment or hiring practice at issue. Courts
might consider the following policy questions when developing the
legal standards:
a. the magnitude of the statistical disparity,
b. the number of individuals affected by the practice,
c. whether similar jobs in similar industries have validated
the practice in question, 157
d. the difficulty of conducting a validation study for a particu-
lar position,
e. the risk and/or cost to the public of having a somewhat
less able person on the job.
If a practice has a large statistical disparity, say a selection ratio
less than .6, meets the three standard deviation criteria and a large
number of individuals are affected, then courts should require a
greater correlation between the employment or hiring practice and
a major productivity characteristic than in situations where a prac-
tice has a disparity just reaching statistical significance, a selection
ratio near .8 and affecting only a modest number of individuals.
The above considerations did play a part in the early EEOC
guidelines, 5 8 but this role was diminished when the Uniform
Guidelines were established in 1978.159 The new guidelines are
more concerned with assuring that validation studies follow tech-
nical standards for the validation of psychological tests than with
developing decision rules balancing the degree of job relatedness
with the effect the practice has on protected groups, the economic
value the practice creates and the health and safety of the
public.1S0
Statistical significance depends on the magnitude of the dis-
parity and the sample size. Thus, when a large number of people
157. The 1978 guidelines mentions the possibility of relying on other validity
studies in § 7 and discusses the possibility of cooperative studies in § 15 F. Uniform
Guidelines on Employer Selection Procedures 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.7 and 1607.15
(1992). The EEOC or Department of Labor might assume a major role in creation
of industry-wide validation studies.
158. 35 Fed. Reg. 12,333 (1970).
159. 43 Fed. Reg. 38,290 (1978).
160. See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMIrrEE ON THE GENERAL APTITUDE
BATT'ERY, FAIRNESs IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING: VALIDITY GENERALIZATION, MINOR-
ITY ISSUES, AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY, 209-34 (1989) (John A.
Hartigan and Alexandra K. Wignor, eds.).
19921
Law and Inequality
take a test, even small differences in pass rates can be statistically
significant. This may have motivated the four-fifths rule. It
makes sense to link the strength of a relationship between a prac-
tice and on-the-job performance to the magnitude of the impact
and the number of people affected. 161
While the increased record-keeping recommended earlier
would increase costs, it should be fairly minimal in this computer
era.162 Furthermore, the data on the validity of tests and related
practices would aid employers in improving the productivity of
their work force as well as eliminating pre-employment criteria
shown to be unrelated to job performance.
In adopting some aspects of cost-benefit analysis in their anal-
ysis of employment practices, courts will need to ensure that pro-
tected groups are not disadvantaged in seeking upper-level
positions because of the relatively small number of them. Plain-
tiffs should be allowed to consider data from a variety of similar
positions, perhaps even in other locations, in order to examine the
effect on protected groups of subjective practices typically used to
fill upper-level jobs.163 Finally, courts have incorporated risk to
the public sector in cases involving police officers and airline
pilots.164
Statistical analysis should be a component of the legal deci-
sion-making process. The above considerations might allow an em-
ployer to use, for example, a word-of-mouth recruitment process
to ensure a small readily available pool of potential employees, es-
pecially when a business is subject to relatively sudden, non-sea-
sonal changes in the demand for its products. If a substantial
fraction of employees were hired in that fashion and the employer
had few minority employees, then courts could continue their pol-
icy of not accepting word-of-mouth recruitment as legitimate ab-
sent strong justification for the practice.165
These recommendations will help to establish a more system-
atic and reliable database so that courts can assess business prac-
tices and their justifications in the same way in similar cases. If an
161. Otherwise, employers may need to spend large sums to validate criteria hav-
ing a minimal impact on job opportunities for protected groups.
162. Similarly, the cost of more detailed Census tabulations should also be small
as the data has been collected and the same program used to obtain the Detailed
Characteristics information for metropolitan areas could be run for each county.
163. See Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95
HARV. L. REv. 947 (1982).
164. See Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Pennsylvania
v. O'Neill, 465 F. Supp. 451 (D. Pa. 1979).
165. See Thomas v. Washington Cty. Sch. Bd., 53 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1754 (4th Cir. 1990).
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employer who preserves employment records can have them used
to prove discrimination while employers who do not preserve them
are excused, obviously there is no incentive to keep records. The
majority noted in Wards Cove that an employer's justification of a
practice having a disparate impact is subject to a reasoned review
and stated: " A mere insubstantial justification in this regard will
not suffice, because such a low standard of review would permit
discrimination to be practiced through the use of spurious, seem-
ingly neutral employment practices."'166 If employers are required
to preserve their records and the government provides reliable de-
tailed labor market data, a proper analysis of employment prac-
tices will be possible. With modern statistical techniques applied
to a fairly comprehensive database, courts should be able to under-
take a reasoned review of employment practices to ensure that
prohibited factors are not playing a role in employment decisions,
while encouraging employers to reward qualifications that increase
productivity and efficiency.
166. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
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